【主讲】杨君印第安纳大学金融学助理教授

【主题】优秀经理人的经济学分析

【时间】6月29日（星期五）14:30-16:00

【地点】清华经管学院舜德楼101

【语言】中/英文

【主办】金融系

【简介】* 主讲内容、演讲者、或其他相关背景资料

“Economics and Super Managers”, joint with Nina Baranchuk and Glenn MacDonald

We study an agency model with a novel combination of features { agents (CEOs) di？er

in their ability, ˉrms choose both the scope of the CEO's activities and their incentives,

and there is free entry by ˉrms. The outcome is an industry equilibrium in which ˉrms are

heterogenous in scope and output. That is, ˉrms hiring more able CEOs complement higher

ability with greater scope and stronger incentives, resulting in greater output. Pay has a

strong \superstars" element in the sense that motivating higher ability CEOs to accept a

job involving more e？ort and greater risk of managing greater scope, requires much greater

rewards.

The model is a simple one that makes strong assumptions; this allows us to analyze it very

completely and arrive at sharp conclusions. For example, we ˉnd that an increase in de-

mand for the industry's product, e.g., a booming economy or opening of foreign economies,

increases both the overall level and skewness of the cross section distribution of CEO com-

pensation. The model suggests a variety of other empirical predictions.

Some preliminary empirical work suggests the model may prove quite useful for under-

standing some interesting trends in compensation. For example, our model provides an

explanation for the recent increased level and dispersion in CEO compensation that is

rooted in product market competition and rational board reaction to changes in the ˉrm's

environment.

详情请点击附件：| resume_IU.pdf